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Abstract 
Much evidence suggests that between-country social comparisons have become more 
important over time due to globalization. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation in a 
multi-country economy, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption 
compared with both other domestic residents and people in other countries. The optimal tax 
policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive 
aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the 
national governments behave as Nash competitors to one another, the resulting tax policy only 
internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax 
policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reflects 
between-country comparisons. We also derive globally efficient tax policies in a cooperative 
framework, and conclude that there are potentially large welfare gains of international tax 
policy coordination resulting from cross-country social comparisons.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of international tax coordination has recently received increased public interest due 
to the extensive discussions following the work by Piketty (2014). His central policy 
recommendation in order to deal with experienced, as well as expected future, growing 
inequalities is international tax policy coordination, and in particular with respect to capital 
taxes and progressive income taxes, where the need for tax coordination is motivated 
primarily by international capital mobility. In the present paper we analyze a different, yet 
potentially very powerful, motive for international tax coordination, namely international 
social comparisons.  Our motivation and approach are outlined below. 
 
The globalization process has implied that information about people and their living 
conditions in other parts of the world has increased rapidly in recent decades. Indeed, the 
technological advancement of TV, Internet, and social media together with increased 
travelling have resulted in much better knowledge of the living conditions of others, and of 
some people in particular (such as the rich and famous), than was the case only a couple of 
decades ago. This suggests that people’s reference consumption is increasingly determined by 
consumption levels in other countries than their own. The present paper explores such 
between-country social comparisons and identifies the corresponding implications for optimal 
income tax policy, which, as far as we know, have not been addressed before.  
 
A rapidly growing literature deals with optimal tax policy implications of relative comparison 
concerns based on one-country models; see, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald 
(1983), Frank (1985a, 2005, 2008), Tuomala (1990), Persson (1995), Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Ireland (2001), Dupor and Liu (2003), Abel (2005), 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010), Wendner (2010, 2014), Alvarez-Cuadrado 
and Long (2011, 2012), Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013) and Kanbur and Tuomala (2014). 
The present paper extends this literature to a multi-country framework where each national 
government can obviously not control the taxes and consumption levels in other countries. 
More specifically, it considers the policy implications of such a broader framework for social 
comparisons by analyzing optimal redistributive, nonlinear income taxation in a multi-country 
setting, where each individual derives utility from his/her relative consumption compared 
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with both other domestic residents and people in other countries. Our approach and 
motivation are outlined in greater detail below. 
 
Much of the empirical happiness and questionnaire-based research dealing with individual 
well-being and relative consumption is silent about the role of cross-country comparisons, 
which is not surprising given the difficulties of measuring such effects.1 Yet arguments have 
recently been made suggesting that such comparisons are likely to have become more 
important over time (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009; Becchetti et al., 2010; Clark 
and Senik, 2011).2 For example, Becchetti et al. (2010) examine the determinants of self-
reported life-satisfaction using survey-data for countries in Western Europe from the early 
1970s to 2002. To be able to assess the effects of cross-country comparisons and whether 
these effects have changed over time, the authors control for determinants of subjective well-
being discussed in earlier literature such as relative income measures based on national 
comparisons (across education, age, and gender groups) as well as domestic GDP. 
Interestingly, the results show that the distance between the GDP of the individual’s own 
country and the GDP of the richest country in the data reduces individual life-satisfaction, and 
that the contribution to well-being of such cross-country comparisons increased over the study 
period. A possible interpretation is that the increased globalization through technological 
advancements in recent decades has meant that social comparisons between countries now 
have a greater influence on individual well-being than before.3 
 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Easterlin (2001), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), Clark et al. (2008), Senik (2009) and 
Clark and Senik (2010) and Card et al. (2012). This literature typically assumes that relative consumption 
concerns are driven by within-country comparisons (based on various reference groups) or does not specify 
relative consumption in a jurisdictional context. Evidence for relative consumption concerns can also be found in 
literature on brain science (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011), experimental work on productivity 
(Cohn et al. 2014) and there are also plausible evolutionary explanations for such concerns, see e.g. Rayo and 
Becker (2007) and Wolpert (2010). 
2 See also James (1987) for an early discussion of how tastes (including positional concerns) are transferred from 
developed to developing countries. Friehe and Mechtel (2014) analyze how the political regime affects 
preferences for conspicuous consumption based on data for East and West Germany after the reunification. 
3 Arguably, this interpretation presupposes that relative consumption concerns are not independent of access to 
social media. Indeed, in a recent survey of Europeans, Clark and Senik (2010) found that people without access 
to the Internet are less concerned with their relative consumption than people with such access. 
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Moreover, Piketty (2014) argues that cross-country social comparisons seem to constitute an 
important part of the motivation behind the success of Thatcher’s and Reagan’s drastic 
income tax reductions in the early 80s. Both the United States and Britain had then for 
decades had lower growth rates than other Western European countries and Japan and hence 
experienced that other countries were catching up. According to Piketty (2014, 509): “For 
countries as well as individual, the wealth hierarchy is not just about money; it is also a matter 
of honor and moral values.”  
 
The policy implications of social comparisons between countries remain largely unexplored. 
To our knowledge, the only exception is Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014), who 
address the optimal provision of national and global public goods in a two-country setting 
where each individual derives well-being from his/her relative private consumption through 
within- and between country comparisons, as well as from the relative consumption of 
national public goods through between-country comparisons. However, that study does not 
address optimal taxation but implicitly assumes that each government can raise sufficient 
revenue for public provision through lump-sum taxation, implying that both externality-
correcting and redistributive roles of the tax system are ignored. 
 
The present study adds at least two important new dimensions. First, since all previous studies 
on tax policy and relative consumption that we are aware of are based on one-country model 
economies, the policy incentives associated with between-country comparisons, as well as 
those resulting from interaction between such comparisons and the (conventional) within-
country comparison, still remain to be explored. Arguably, this is empirically relevant for the 
reasons mentioned above. Second, since between-country comparisons give rise to 
international externalities, the tax policies decided by national governments are no longer 
necessarily efficient at the global level. This leads to the question of tax policy coordination 
and cooperation among countries. The value of coordinated tax policy has of course been 
identified before due to cross-country environmental externalities as well as international 
labor and capital mobility, see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Huber (1999), Aronsson 
and Blomquist (2003), Keen and Konrad (2012), and Bierbrauer et al. (2013). Yet, this issue 
has been neglected so far in the study of tax policy under social interaction. Since the aim is to 
better understand the mechanisms of social interaction and their tax policy implication, we 
will throughout the paper ignore these other motives for policy coordination.   
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Section 2 presents the basic model of a multi-country economy, where individual utility 
depends on the individual’s own consumption of goods and leisure as well as on the 
individual’s relative consumption based on within-country and between-country comparisons, 
respectively. Section 3 deals with optimal income taxation for a baseline case where 
individuals are identical within each country (although not necessarily between countries). 
This model means that income taxation has no redistributive purpose and is motivated solely 
by the desire to internalize the positional externalities. As such, it generalizes results derived 
by, e.g., Persson (1995), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Dupor and Liu (2003) to a multi-
country setting. We start with the non-cooperative Nash solution, where each country takes 
the behavior of other countries as given. Each government will then fully internalize the 
positional externalities affecting people within its own country, but completely ignore the 
externalities affecting other countries. These externality-correcting taxes are expressed in 
terms of (empirically estimable) degrees of positionality, i.e., the degree to which relative 
consumption matters compared with absolute consumption.  
 
However, while Nash competition is a common assumption in earlier literature on 
international externalities, it is not always the most realistic one since the ability to commit to 
public policy may differ among countries, e.g., due to differences in resources, size, and 
opportunities. Therefore, we also analyze a Stackelberg equilibrium where one country is 
acting as leader and the others as followers. While the policy incentives faced by the 
followers are analogous to those in the Nash equilibrium, we show that the leader will also 
take into account the externalities it causes to others, since such externalities will affect 
others’ behavior. In addition, if the preferences of the followers are characterized by a 
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses property, such that they prefer to consume more (and hence use 
less leisure) when the leader consumes more, ceteris paribus, then this constitutes a reason for 
the leader to increase the marginal income tax rate beyond the Nash equilibrium rate, and vice 
versa.  
 
Section 4 analyzes the potential for cooperative behavior. First we show, based on both the 
Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium, that there is scope for Pareto 
improvements through a small coordinated increase in the marginal income tax rates. Second, 
we consider a two-country framework where each government can pay the other country for 
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increasing its marginal income tax rates. We then obtain a globally Pareto-efficient allocation 
implying that each government will fully internalize all positional externalities associated 
with private consumption, including those imposed on other countries. This is accomplished 
through a simple Pigouvian tax based on the sum of the marginal willingness to pay of all 
individuals, within as well as between the countries, to avoid the externality. In turn, this 
corrective tax depends on the extent to which relative consumption is important for individual 
well-being both in the domestic and foreign dimensions.  
 
Section 5 generalizes the model used in Sections 3-4 to the more realistic case where there are 
also redistributional concerns within each country, and where the government has to rely on 
distortionary taxation for this redistribution due to asymmetric information. This 
generalization is clearly relevant from a practical policy perspective, and also because earlier 
literature shows that the optimal tax policy responses to relative consumption concerns in 
second-best economies may differ substantially from the policy responses typically derived in 
a full information context (see, e.g., Oswald, 1983; Tuomala, 1990; Ireland, 2001; Aronsson 
and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 2010).  
 
As the basic working horse in Section 5, we use an extension of the two-type model 
developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), where the government in each country can use 
nonlinear income taxes but not tax leisure or ability directly. This two-type model provides a 
useful framework for characterizing how corrective and redistribution motives for taxation 
jointly contribute to policy incentives. From a practical policy perspective, this model 
obviously constitutes a crude picture of the society.4 However, the purpose here is not to 
analyze the appropriate tax levels, but rather analyze how social comparisons of different 
kinds modify the policy rules for optimal income taxation. These modifications would be 
basically identical if they were instead based on a much less tractable model with many 
                                                          
4 For instance, results derived for the high-ability type in such a framework would only be valid for the highest 
ability type in a model with more than two types. As such, the optimal tax policy implemented for the high-
ability type in a two-type model tends to provide a bad approximation of the optimal tax policy for almost all 
ability levels in more realistic models based on a continuous ability-distribution. 
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ability-types.5 Based on such two-type models, we then show that the basic findings obtained 
in Sections 3-4 continue to hold under certain conditions, but that interactions between 
externality correction and redistribution through the self-selection constraint may also have 
important implications for optimal taxation.  
 
Section 6 concludes that international social comparisons have important implications for 
optimal income tax policy and that they also constitute a potentially important reason for 
international income tax policy coordination; a reason that will most likely become even more 
important over time as globalization continues.      
 
 
2. Preferences and Individual Behavior 
 
In this section, we outline the basics of our model assuming that people have preferences for 
relative consumption both within and between countries. We have no ambition to explain why 
people derive utility from their relative consumption. An alternative approach would be to 
start from conventional preferences where instead relative consumption has a purely 
instrumental value; see, e.g., Cole et al. (1995) for arguments in favor of such an approach 
and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014) for an interesting recent matching application. Yet, while 
we certainly share the view that there are important instrumental reasons underlying why 
relative consumption matters, we see two main reasons for simply imposing such concerns 
directly into the utility function in the present paper. First, the fact that there has been an 
important evolutionary value to have more wealth than others provides an obvious reason for 
why selfish genes would prefer to belong to people with preferences for relative wealth and 
status (just as they would prefer to belong to people with preferences for having sex and 
against eating poisoned food); cf., Frank (1985b), Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker 
(2007).6 Second, the shortcut to ignore instrumental reasons in the model, and hence focus 
                                                          
5 Another alternative would be to consider a linear tax problem. However, results based on models restricted to 
linear tax instruments are typically much harder to interpret since they in addition to the inherent second-best 
problem due to information limitation also reflect the rather arbitrary linearity restriction. 
6 One might object that the evolutionary arguments are stronger for social comparisons within small groups than 
between countries, just as the evolutionary arguments for pro-social behavior are stronger within small groups. 
While agreeing in principle, we still have two counter-arguments: First, there is actually compelling evidence in 
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solely on effects through the utility function, makes the model comparable to much earlier 
literature on public policy and relative consumption as well as more tractable and suitable for 
analyzing the optimal tax problems at stake. 
 
The model consists of a large number, n, of small countries with fixed populations. To begin 
with, we assume that the population in each country consists of a fixed number of identical 
individuals normalized to one. This assumption is relaxed in Section 5 below, where we 
introduce differences in ability (productivity) between individuals and assume that this ability 
is private information. Each individual in country i derives utility from his/her absolute 
consumption of goods, ic , and use of leisure, iz , and also from his/her relative consumption 
compared with other people. The latter is of two kinds: relative consumption compared with 
other people in the individual’s own country, iR , and relative consumption compared with 
people in other countries, iS . Relative consumption of the first kind can then be written as 
( , )i i i iR r c c= , where ic  is average consumption in country i. Correspondingly, we can write 
relative consumption of the second kind, i.e., compared with the n-1 other countries, as a 
vector 
 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) { ( , ),..., ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )}i i i i i i ii i i ii i i in i nS s c c s c c s c c s c c s c c− − − + += = , 
where ic −  is a vector of average consumption levels in all countries except country i.  
 
The utility function faced by the representative individual in country i is given by7 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ( , ), ( , ) , , ,i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iU v c z R S v c z r c c s c c u c z c c− −= = = , (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
favor of what Singer (1983) denotes the expanding circle with respect to pro-social behavior and ethics, i.e., that 
human beings over time tend to take into account consequences for larger and larger groups of people; see in 
particular Pinker (2012). Second, we are not biologically well adapted to the recent technological development 
implying, e.g., that we may emotionally perceive people on TV to be closer to us than most people who live in 
the same block.   
7 Following most previous comparable literature, we assume that leisure is completely non-positional, meaning 
that people only care about the absolute level of leisure. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013a) analyze a 
model of optimal taxation where the consumers have positional preferences with respect to both private 
consumption and leisure. 
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where , ,i i iv u r  and all elements of is  are twice continuously differentiable. The function  
( )iv ⋅  is assumed to be increasing in each argument and strictly quasi-concave, and describes 
the individual’s utility as a function of his/her own consumption and use of leisure, 
respectively, as well as of his/her relative consumption compared with others. The function 
( )iu ⋅  is a convenient reduced form allowing us to shorten some of the notations below. For 
further use, we summarize the relationships between ( )iu ⋅  and ( )iv ⋅  as follows: 
 
i i i i i i
c c R c S cu v v r v s= + +  
i i
z zu v=  
i i
i i i
Rc c
u v r=  
i i
i i i
Sc c
u v s− −= , 
 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, i.e., /i i icu u c= ∂ ∂ , /
i i i
cv v c= ∂ ∂ , /
i i i
cr r c= ∂ ∂ , and 
/i i ics s c= ∂ ∂ , and similarly for the partial derivatives with respect to 
iz , ic , and ic − . 
 
We also assume that ( )ir ⋅  and ( )is ⋅  satisfy the criterion that the value of each function is 
unaffected if the individual’s own and others’ consumption are changed equally, i.e., ii iccr r= −  
and kik ikccs s= −  for all i, k such that i k≠ . The first assumption is fairly innocuous and 
encompasses the most commonly used comparison forms, i.e., the difference comparison 
form where i i iR c c= − , the ratio comparison case where /i i iR c c= , and the flexible functional 
form suggested by Dupor and Liu (2003), which includes both the difference and the ratio 
forms as special cases. The second assumption, i.e., kik ikccs s= − , is stronger and essentially 
implies the difference comparison form such that ik i kS c c= − .8 Note also that people in 
different countries need not be identical regarding consumption levels or preferences. 
                                                          
8 Although a flexible functional form is always preferable to more restrictive formulations, it is of no great 
importance for the qualitative results whether the analysis is based on difference comparisons (such as in 
Akerlof, 1997; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Bowles and Park, 2005; and Carlsson et 
al., 2007) or ratio comparisons (such as in Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; and 
Wendner and Goulder, 2008). Mujcic and Frijters (2013) compare models based on difference comparisons, ratio 
comparisons and rank comparisons without being able to discriminate between them, whereas Corazzini et al. 
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The government in country i can tax private income (and hence consumption) by utilizing an 
income tax it  and distribute back the revenues in lump-sum form, such that each individual 
receives a lump-sum payment, iτ , regardless of behavior. For simplicity we assume a linear 
technology and perfect competition, implying zero profits, and that productivity is fixed with 
fixed before-tax wage rates iw . The individual budget constraint can then be written as 
 
( )(1 )i i i i iw z t cτΩ− − + = , (2) 
 
where Ω  is the total time available (i.e., 24 hours a day). 
 
Although the measures of reference consumption facing the representative consumer in 
country i, i.e., ic  and ic − , are endogenous in our model, we assume that each individual treats 
them as exogenous. This reflects the idea that each individual is small relative to the economy 
as a whole, which is the conventional assumption in models with externalities. The individual 
first order condition regarding the consumption-leisure tradeoff then becomes 
 
[1 ]i i i ic zu w t u− = , (3) 
 
where (as before) subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
 
 
2.1 Degrees of positionality 
 
The optimal tax policy presented below depends on the extent to which relative consumption 
matters at the individual level (and not just on whether or not it matters). Following 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), we introduce 
the concept of “degrees of positionality” as reflections of the extent to which relative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2012) find that absolute differences, and not only rank, matter, suggesting that models based solely on rank 
comparisons are more restrictive than the other formulations. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013b) show 
that the optimal tax policy implications of relative consumption concerns tend to be qualitatively similar 
regardless of whether these comparisons take the difference or ratio form. 
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consumption matters for utility. Yet, since we have several countries, we will have different 
measures for the extent to which relative consumption matters within the country and the 
extent to which relative consumption matters between countries.  
 
Let us define the degree of domestic positionality as 
 
i i
i R c
i i i i i
c R c S c
v r
v v r v s
α =
+ +
, (4) 
 
where iSv and 
i
cs  are vectors such that 
1 1 1{ ,..., , ,..., }i i ii ii inS S S S Sv v v v v
− +≡  
1 1 1{ ,..., , ,... }i i ii ii in Tc c c c cs s s s s
− +≡ , 
while /ik i kSv v S≡ ∂ ∂ , /
ik ik i
cs s c≡ ∂ ∂ , and 
i
i i ik ik
S c S ck
v s v s
−
= ∑ . The variable iα  reflects the 
fraction of the overall utility increase from the last dollar consumed that is due to the 
increased relative consumption compared with other people in the individual’s own country.  
 
Similarly, we can define the partial degree of foreign positionality as 
 
ik ik
ik S c
i i i i i
c R c S c
v s
v v r v s
β =
+ +
, (5a) 
 
which reflects the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last dollar consumed by the 
representative consumer in country i that is due to the increased relative consumption 
compared with people in country k. Note that comparisons with the consumption levels in 
some countries (e.g., neighbors) may of course be more important than with those in other 
countries. We can then define the overall degree of foreign positionality as 
 
i
i i
i ik S c
i i i i ik
c R c S c
v s
v v r v s
β β
−
= =
+ +∑ . (5b) 
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As such, iβ  reflects the fraction of the utility increase from the last dollar consumed that is 
due to the increased relative consumption compared with people in other countries. Note that 
iβ  thus reflects the net effect of all relative consumption comparisons with the other 
countries. The total degree of positionality is then correspondingly defined as 
 
i i iρ α β= + , (6) 
 
meaning that iρ  reflects the fraction of the utility increase from the last dollar consumed that 
is due to increased relative consumption of any kind, i.e., including comparisons with people 
both within and outside the individual’s own country.  
 
 
3. Optimal Tax Policy and Noncooperative Behavior 
 
We start in subsection 3.1 by considering the policy implications of a Nash equilibrium such 
that each national government treats the decisions made in the other countries as exogenous. 
In subsection 3.2, we consider a Stackelberg equilibrium, where one of the countries is acting 
as leader and the others as followers. 
 
3.1 Nash competition 
 
The decision-problem of the government in country i implies maximization of iU , where the 
externalities that each domestic resident imposes on other domestic residents are taken into 
account, while the externalities imposed on other countries remain uninternalized. As such, 
the government in country i recognizes that ic  is endogenous, while it treats ic −  as 
exogenous. By using that the tax revenue is returned lump-sum to the consumer, the resource 
constraint for country i is given by 
 
( )i i iw z cΩ− = . (7) 
 
If based on the utility formulation ( )iu ⋅  in equation (1), the Lagrangean can be written as 
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( ), , , [ ( ) ]i i i i i i i i i iL u c z c c w z cγ−= + Ω− − . (8) 
 
For presentational convenience, we follow convention in the literature on optimal nonlinear 
taxation in writing the public decision-problem in country i as a direct decision-problem, 
which is solved by choosing  ic  and iz  to maximize equation (8) subject to i ic c= , while 
treating ic −  as exogenous. The corresponding first order conditions are given by 
 
i
i i i
c c
u u γ+ = , (9) 
i i i
zu wγ= . (10) 
 
A Nash equilibrium in this economy is an allocation such that equations (3), (7), (9) and (10) 
are satisfied simultaneously for all countries involved. Since our model is based on the 
general utility functions given in equation (1), rather than a specific functional form, we are of 
course not able to derive closed form solutions for the variables involved. However, such 
explicit solutions are not required for a general characterization of the marginal income tax 
rates implicit in Nash equilibrium, which is our concern here. By using equations (9) and (10) 
and the private first order condition for labor supply given by equation (3), we obtain the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 1. The marginal income tax rate facing the representative consumer in an 
arbitrary country i in Nash equilibrium is given by 
i it α= . 
 
Proof: Combining equations (9) and (10) gives 
( )ii i i iz c cu w u u= + . (11) 
Using i i i i i ic c zu w t u w u= −  from equation (3), substituting into equation (11), and solving for 
it  
yields 
i
i
i c
i
c
u
t
u
= − . (12) 
14 
 
Finally, using equations (1) and (4), we can rewrite equation (12) in terms of the degree of 
domestic positionality. Since i i i i i ic c R c S cu v v r v s= + +  and i i
i i i
Rc c
u v r= , we have 
i
i i i i
Ri ic R c
i i i i i i i i i i
c R c S c c R c S c
v r v rt
v v r v s v v r v s
α= − = =
+ + + +
, (13) 
where we have used that ii iccr r= − . QED 
 
Hence, the optimal tax is simply given by the sum of people’s marginal willingness to pay for 
an individual to reduce his/her consumption, where the sum of the marginal willingness to pay 
is measured within the own country. Each government will fully internalize the positional 
externalities within its own country, but not at all internalize the positional externalities 
inferred on other countries.9 And a tax that fully internalizes the positional externalities within 
the country, in turn, equals the degree of domestic positionality as defined by equation (4). 
Yet, it should be clear that the tax formula in Proposition 1 does not implement a global 
welfare optimum, since transnational positional externalities are ignored. 
 
3.2 Country i is a Stackelberg leader 
 
Assume now instead that country i is a Stackelberg leader in relation to country k, which is a 
Stackelberg follower, and that it plays the Nash game with all other countries.10 If the 
government in country k is a Stackelberg follower, it clearly behaves as in the Nash 
equilibrium. Yet, the optimization problem for country i is modified, since i will take into 
account welfare effects on i caused by the changed actions in k that choices by i induce. As a 
consequence, the government in country i will not take the consumption in country k as given, 
as it did in subsection 3.1 above, but rather let it be a function of its own consumption, such 
that ( )k k ic c c= . Then we can instead write the Lagrangean as 
  
 ( ),, , , ( ), [ ( ) ]i i i i i k i i k i i i iL u c z c c c c w z cγ−= + Ω− − , (14) 
 
                                                          
9 As such, the corrective tax derived here resembles Nash equilibrium tax formulas in the literature on 
environmental policy (e.g., van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992; Aronsson and Löfgren, 2000). 
10 The assumption that it plays the Stackelberg game with only one follower country is made for convenience; it 
is straightforward to allow several countries to be Stackelberg followers. 
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where ,i kc −  denotes a vector of average consumption levels in all other countries than i and k, 
which are still treated as exogenous by the government in country i. The first order conditions 
become  
 
i k
k
i i i i
c ic c
cu u u
c
γ∂+ + =
∂
, (15) 
 i i izu wγ= . (16) 
 
A Stackelberg equilibrium is in this model an allocation where the leader-country satisfies 
equations (3), (7), (15) and (16), while the follower and other Nash-competing countries 
satisfy equations (3), (7), (9) and (10). Again, given the general form of the utility function, 
we cannot derive closed form solutions for the variables involved, but can still characterize 
the optimal tax policy implicit in the Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of underlying policy 
incentives. 
 
Before we analyze the tax policy implemented by the Stackelberg leader in any detail, the 
relationship between ic  and kc  in equation (15) needs to be addressed, since the incentive for 
country i to exercise leadership through tax policy depends on how country k (the Stackelberg 
follower) responds to an increase in ic , ceteris paribus. The following characterization will 
then be used: 
 
Definition 1. The consumption in country k is characterized by a cross-country keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses) property with respect to the consumption 
in country i if 
 0 ( 0)
k
i
c
c
∂
> <
∂
. 
 
Let ( ) /kk k k kcz c zcSMRS u u u= +  denote the social marginal rate of substitution between private 
consumption and leisure from the point of view of country k, whose government treats ic  as 
exogenous. In other words, ,
k
c zSMRS reflects the marginal rate of substitution between private 
consumption and leisure in country k for a given relative consumption within the country (but 
not between countries). We can then derive the following result: 
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Lemma 1.  0
k
i
c
c
∂
>
∂
 ( 0)<  iff  0
k
cz
i
SMRS
c
∂
>
∂
 ( )0< . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 
Using Definition 1 and Lemma 1, we are now ready to analyze the optimal tax policy implicit 
in the Stackelberg game equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal income tax formula in country k, where the government is a 
Stackelberg follower, is the same as in the Nash equilibrium. The optimal marginal income 
tax in country i, where the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k, is given by 
 
 
k
i i ik
i
ct
c
α β∂= +
∂
. 
 
Conditional on iα , therefore, the optimal marginal income tax rate facing the Stackelberg 
leader is larger (smaller) than the optimal rate implied by the Nash equilibrium formula if the 
utility function in country k is such that 
 0
k
cz
i
SMRS
c
∂
>
∂
 ( )0< , 
meaning that the consumption in country k is characterized by a cross-country keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses) property with respect to the consumption 
in country i. 
 
 
Proof: Starting with the tax formula, we combine equations (15) and (16) to derive 
 i k
k
i i i i i
z c ic c
cu w u u u
c
 ∂
= + + ∂ 
. (17) 
Next, combining equations (3) and (17) and solving for it , gives 
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i k
k
i i
ic ci
i
c
cu u
ct
u
∂
+
∂= − . (18) 
Finally, since i i i i i ic c R c S cu v v r v s= + +  and k k
i i i
Sc c
u v s=  as defined above, we obtain 
 
i k
k
i i i i
kR S ic ci i ik
i i i i i i
c R c S c
cv r v s cct
v v r v s c
α β
∂
+ ∂∂= − = +
+ + ∂
, (19) 
where we have used ii iccr r= −  and j
i i
cc
s s= − . The second part follows immediately from 
combing equation (19) with Lemma 1. QED 
 
Thus, the optimal marginal income tax rate in country i, the Stackelberg leader, is larger than 
the rate corresponding to optimal taxation in the Nash equilibrium if consumption becomes 
more valuable relative to leisure on the margin in country k due to a consumption increase in 
country i. Intuitively, if increased consumption in country i induces people to consume more 
in country k, and hence causes larger negative externalities on country i, this constitutes a 
reason to reduce the consumption in country i, and hence to increase the marginal income tax. 
 
4. Cooperative Solutions 
 
4.1 The scope for a Pareto-improving tax reform 
 
We showed in Section 3 that each government in the Nash equilibrium will only internalize 
the positional externalities caused in their own country. The same applies in the Stackelberg 
case, where the optimum conditions are the same for the followers, while the leader will also 
add a component related to induced consumption changes in other countries due to 
transnational keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effects. Thus, there is scope for Pareto-improving 
tax reforms: 
 
Proposition 3. Based on either the Nash equilibrium or Stackelberg game equilibrium, there 
is scope for Pareto-improving tax reforms through small increases in the marginal income tax 
rates. 
 
18 
 
Proof: The welfare effect in country i if country k reduces its own consumption through a 
small increase in the marginal income tax rate is given by 
 0k
k
i
kc
cu
t
∂
>
∂
, 
while the domestic welfare effect in country k is equal to zero (since each country has already 
made an optimal policy choice based on its own objective and constraints). This holds 
irrespective of whether the pre-reform equilibrium is based on the Nash or the Stackelberg 
game, and whether in the latter case i is the leader or the follower. QED 
 
Given that a Pareto improvement is possible, it is natural to ask how much the government in 
country i would be willing to pay country k for a small increase in kt , and how this marginal 
willingness to pay depends on the strength of the relative consumption concerns in country i. 
Let ikM denote i’s marginal willingness to pay for increasing the income tax in country k, 
where 
 
 0k
i
i k k
ik ikc
i i k k
c c
u c cM
u u t t
β∂ ∂= = − >
+ ∂ ∂
. (20) 
 
Equation (20) indicates that the (partial) degree of foreign positionality plays a key role for 
tax coordination, as it determines how much the government in country i is willing to pay for 
a small decrease in the consumption in country k, ceteris paribus. Notice also that the same 
algebraic expression holds irrespective of whether i and k are Nash competitors (as in 
subsection 3.1) or agents in the Stackelberg game where i is leader (as in subsection 3.2), 
although the level of i:s marginal willingness to pay may, of course, depend on the game. 
 
4.2. Efficient international negotiations on the tax rates 
 
Here we consider the somewhat extreme case where countries can negotiate with each other 
about tax policy without transaction costs. Suppose for convenience that we have only the two 
countries i and k, who can negotiate efficiently about the other country’s marginal income tax 
rate. Country i would then be willing to buy a further marginal tax increase in country k as 
long as the welfare cost to i of paying k is lower than the welfare gain to i of the associated 
reduced consumption in k. Let us also assume that the countries succeed in finding an 
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agreement such that no Pareto improvements are possible. This means that the marginal 
income tax rates will be (globally) Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation of such a 
resource allocation is that it corresponds to the outcome of a global social planner aiming to 
obtain a globally Pareto-efficient allocation.   
 
Consider the Lagrangean corresponding to the maximization of utility in country i subject to a 
constraint that utility is held fixed in country k and an overall resource constraint:  
 
 [ ] [ ( ) ( ) ]i k k i i i k k kL u u U w z c w z cµ γ= + − + Ω− − + Ω− − . (21) 
 
where kU  is the fixed utility for country k. The corresponding first order conditions can be 
written as  
 
i i
i i k
c c c
u u uµ γ+ + = , (22) 
k k
i k k
cc c
u u uµ µ γ+ + = , (23) 
/i izu w γ= , (24) 
/k kzu wµ γ= . (25) 
 
We have derived the following result: 
 
Proposition 4. For country i, which can negotiate with another country k without transaction 
costs, the optimal marginal income tax rate is given by 
1 0
1
i i
i i k
k kt
α βα β
α β
− +
= + >
− +
. 
 
Proof: Equations (24) and (25) imply  
 /
/
i i i k
z z
k k k i
z z
u w u w
u w u w
µ = = . (26) 
Combine equations (22) and (23) and use equation (26) to substitute for µ  
 1 1i k k i
i i k kk i
i kc c c cz z
k i i i k k
c c c c c c
u u u uu uw w
u u u u u u
   
+ − = + −   
      
, (27) 
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while equations (22), (24), and (26) can be combined in a similar way to give 
 
i
i
ki
kcz
i kk
c cz
ik i
c i icz
i i
c c
uu w
u uu
uu u w w
u u
=
− −
. (28) 
Substituting equation (28) into equation (27) and using the individual budget constraints 
/ [1 ]i i i iz cu w u t= −  imply 
 
1
1
i k
i i
k i
i i
c c
i ki i
i c c c c
k ki k
c cc c
k k
c c
u u
u uu ut
u uu u
u u
+ −
= − −
+ −
. (29) 
Finally, rewriting equation (29) in terms of positionality degrees such that /ii i iccu u α= − , 
/ki i iccu u β= − , /k
k k k
cc
u u α= − , and /ik k kccu u β= −  gives the formula in Proposition 4. QED 
 
Thus, the optimal marginal income tax rate looks almost like a conventional Pigouvian tax 
based on the sum of all people’s (including people from other countries) marginal willingness 
to pay for reducing consumption by an individual in country i, which would be given by 
 i i
i k
i i kc c
i k
c c
u u
t
u u
α β= − − = + . 
Yet, the second term in the tax formula in Proposition 4, related to the sum of the marginal 
willingness to pay by residents in the foreign country, ik kccu u , has a modifying factor attached 
to it. We will return to this factor and the intuition behind Proposition 4. Let us first present 
the more straightforward results from the symmetric case where the positionality degrees are 
identical in both countries: 
 
Corollary 1.  If i kα α α= =  and i kβ β β= = , the optimal marginal income tax rate for 
country i, which can negotiate without transaction costs with another country k, is given by 
 0i i kt α β α β ρ= + = + = > . 
 
Proof: Follows directly from Proposition 4.  
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Hence, the optimal marginal income tax rate in the symmetric case is a simple Pigouvian tax 
given by the aggregate global marginal willingness to pay for reduced consumption by an 
individual in country i. In turn, this sum equals the total degree of positionality, ρ . Basically, 
the tax reflects the part of consumption that is waste, due to zero-sum relative comparison 
effects, whereas leisure is purely non-positional (by assumption). As such, Corollary 1 
provides a straightforward generalization of the efficient tax policy derived in the context of 
one-country economies in, e.g., Persson (1995), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Dupor and 
Liu (2003). 
 
Let us now turn to the modifying factor in the non-symmetric case, i.e., 
 1
1
i i
k k
α β
α β
− +
− +
. 
Suppose first that the β -factors are small, such that the modifying factor can be approximated 
by (1 ) / (1 )i kα α− − . Then, if i kα α> , the modifying factor for the marginal income tax rate 
in country i becomes less than unity. The intuition is that i kα α>  implies that the optimal 
marginal income tax in country i is larger than in country k. In turn, this means that a larger 
fraction of an income increase in country i is taxed away, such that a smaller fraction of this 
income increase causes a negative consumption externality. In the more general case where 
the β -factors are not small, also these factors will affect how much of an income increase in 
relative terms will be taxed away. A large β  in country i then implies that a larger fraction 
will be taxed away in country k (rather than in country i), and vice versa. As such, the relative 
weight given to domestic externality-correction is reduced in country i, which also explains 
why the β -factors affect the modifying factor in the opposite direction compared with the α -
factors. 
 
How would the analysis change if we were to include many countries? In principle, the 
problem of finding a Pareto-efficient allocation is both qualitatively and quantitatively 
equivalent in the many-country case. Yet, the coordination problem is much more complex, as 
the consumption in a single country will cause utility losses in many other countries. The 
optimal marginal income tax rate would, therefore, also take a more complex form than in 
Proposition 4; in particular, the second part of the tax formula would be expanded if 
additional countries were included. At the same time, the interpretation in terms of the 
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outcome of a negotiation process without transaction costs is much less straightforward here, 
since there would be many potential coalitions and many Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, the 
interpretation in terms of the outcome of a global social planner would still be valid, and the 
scope for international tax policy coordination remains large. 
 
5. Distributional Concerns and Asymmetric Information 
 
So far, we have assumed that people are identical within each country, and that the only 
reason for using income taxes is to correct for positional externalities. In reality, however, 
taxation has many purposes, a central one being to redistribute income. In this section, we 
generalize the model to encompass heterogeneity and distributional concerns within each 
country. As a work horse, we utilize a modified version of the Stern-Stiglitz optimal nonlinear 
income taxation model with two ability types in each country.  
 
Each country is characterized by asymmetric information between the government and the 
private sector, such that the government can observe (and hence tax) income but not leisure. 
Furthermore, we assume (as we did above) that the population in each country is fixed; this 
simplifies the analysis and allows us to abstract from the implications of labor mobility for 
redistributive policy at the national level. 
 
There are two ability types in each country and ijn  individuals of ability type j in country i. 
Each such individual faces the following utility function:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ( , ), ( , ) , , ,i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ij j j j j j j j j j j j j j j jU v c z R S v c z r c c s c c u c z c c− −= = = , (30) 
 
for j=1, 2. Equation (30) allows for the same between-country differences in preferences as 
equation (1); yet, it also allows the two ability types in the same country to have different 
preferences and make different relative consumption comparisons. All notations are the same 
as in the previous two sections, with the exception that the variables are both ability-type 
specific and country-specific here (and not just country-specific as above). 
 
The individual budget constraint is given by   
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( )i i i i i ij j j j jw l T w l c− = , (31) 
 
where i ij jl z= Ω−  denotes the hours of work by ability type j in country i, and ( )
iT ⋅  is a 
nonlinear income tax decided by the government in country i. The corresponding first order 
condition for the consumption-leisure tradeoff becomes 
 
, ,[1 '( )] 0
i i i i i i
j c j j j j zu w T w l u− − = , (32) 
 
where , /
i i i
j c j ju u c= ∂ ∂  and , /
i i i
j z j ju u z= ∂ ∂ , while '( )
i i i
j jT w l  denotes the marginal income tax 
rate facing ability type j in country i. 
 
5.1 Degrees of positionality 
 
The positionality degrees are defined in the same general way as in the representative-agent 
framework set out above. Yet, since the utility functions may differ between types, the 
positionality degrees may differ too for that particular reason (and, of course, also because the 
two ability types face different constraints). By analogy to the positionality measures 
presented in subsection 2.1, the partial degrees of domestic and foreign positionality for an 
individual of type j in country i can be written as 
 
, ,
, , , , ,
i i
j R j ci
j i i i i i
j c j R j c j S j c
v r
v v r v s
α =
+ +
, (33) 
 , ,
, , , , ,
ik ik
j S j cik
j i i i i i
j c j R j c j S j c
v s
v v r v s
β =
+ +
, (34a) 
, ,
, , , , ,
i
i i
j S j ci ik
j j i i i i ik
j c j R j c j S j c
v s
v v r v s
β β
−
= =
+ +∑ , (34b) 
 
where 1 1 1, , , , ,{ ,..., , ,..., }
i i ii ii in
j S j S j S j S j Sv v v v v
− +≡  is a vector of the partial derivatives of the utility 
function for an individual of ability type j in country i with respect to each relative 
consumption vis-à-vis the average consumption in other countries. Correspondingly, 
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1 1 1
, , , , ,{ ,..., , ,... }
i i ii ii in T
j c j c j c j c j cs s s s s
− +≡ is a (column) vector of partial derivatives of these cross-country 
relative consumption measures with respect to the individual’s own consumption, such that 
, , , ,
i
i i ik ik
j S j c j S j ck
v s v s
−
= ∑ . 
 
The interpretations are the same as before, with the only exception that the degrees of 
positionality are ability-type specific here: ijα  reflects the fraction of the overall utility 
increase from the last dollar consumed for an individual of ability type j in country i that is 
due to the increased relative consumption compared with others in the individual’s own 
country,  while ijβ  denotes the corresponding fraction of the utility increase that is due to the 
increased relative consumption compared with people in other countries. The total degree of 
positionality for an individual of ability type j in country i is then defined as 
 
i
i i ik i i
j j j j jk
ρ α β α β
−
= + = +∑ . (35) 
 
For further use, we also calculate the corresponding average degrees of positionality in 
country i as  
 
1 1 2 2
i i i i
i
i
n n
N
α α
α
+
= , (36a) 
1 1 2 2
i ik i ik
ik
i
n n
N
β β
β
+
= , (36b) 
1 1 2 2
i i i i
i
i
n n
N
β β
β
+
= , (36c) 
 
where 1 2
i i iN n n= +  denotes the total population in country i. 
 
5.2 The second-best problem of the government 
 
Let type 1 be the low-ability type and type 2 the high-ability type, which means that 2 1
i iw w> . 
The objective of the government in each county is again to obtain a Pareto-efficient resource 
allocation, which can be accomplished by maximizing the utility of the low-ability type 
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subject to a minimum utility restriction for the high-ability type, as well as subject to a self-
selection constraint and the budget constraint. We also follow the standard approach in 
assuming that the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability 
type. The self-selection constraint that must be imposed to prevent the high-ability type from 
mimicking the low-ability type can then be written as 
 
( ) 12 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
2
ˆ, , , , , ,
i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i
wU u c z c c u c l c c U
w
− − = ≥ Ω− = 
 
.   (37a) 
 
The expression on the left-hand side of the weak inequality is the utility of the high-ability 
type, while the right-hand side denotes the utility of the mimicker. A mimicking high-ability 
type faces the same before-tax income (and in this case also consumption) as the low-ability 
type; yet, since the mimicker is more productive, he/she can reach this income with less effort 
than the low-ability type. Throughout the paper, we use the hat symbol (^) to denote 
mimicker variables. 
 
As we are considering a pure redistribution problem under positional externalities, it follows 
that the government’s overall resource constraint can be written as 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) 0
i i i i i i i in w l c n w l c− + − = ,                                   (37b) 
 
 i.e., overall production equals overall consumption. 
  
Therefore, and by analogy with earlier literature based on the self-selection approach to 
optimal income taxation (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1982; Boadway and Keen, 1993), the marginal 
income tax rates can be derived implicitly by choosing the number of work hours and private 
consumption for each ability type in each country based on the following Lagrangean for an 
arbitrary country i: 
 
1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2ˆ[ ] [ ] [ ( ) ( )]
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iL u u u u u n w l c n w l cδ l γ= + − + − + − + − . (38) 
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In equation (38), utility is written in terms of the function ( )iju ⋅  defined in equation (30), and 
2ˆ
iu  therefore denotes the utility of the mimicker. The variables iδ , il , and iγ  are Lagrange 
multipliers. 
 
5.3 Optimal tax policy in the Nash-competition case 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, the government in country i treats consumption (and hence average 
consumption) in all other countries as exogenous, and vice versa. The first order conditions 
for 1
il , 1
ic , 2
il , and 2
ic  are then given as follows: 
 
1
1, 2, 1 1
2
ˆ 0
i
i i i i i i
z zi
wu u n w
w
l γ− + + = , (39)  
1
1, 2, 1ˆ 0
ii
i i i i i
c c i i
nLu u n
c N
l γ ∂− − + =
∂
, (40) 
2, 2 2( ) 0
i i i i i i
zu n wδ l γ− + + = , (41) 
 
2
2, 2( ) 0
ii
i i i i i
c i i
nLu n
c N
δ l γ ∂+ − + =
∂
, (42) 
 
where 
 
 
1, 2, 2,
ˆ( )i i i
i
i i i i i i
i c c c
L u u u
c
δ l l∂ = + + −
∂
. (43) 
 
Equation (43) measures the partial welfare effect for country i of an increase in ic , which will 
be referred to as the within-country positionality effect in what follows. We will return to this 
measure in more detail below. A Nash equilibrium can then be defined as an allocation where 
equations (32), (37) and (39)-(43) are satisfied simultaneously for all countries involved. 
 
Before presenting the results, let us introduce ijσ as a short notation for the optimal marginal 
income tax rate implemented for ability type j in country i in a standard two-type model 
without any direct policy adjustment to relative consumption concerns, i.e., 
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2, 1
1 1, 2,
1 1 2
ˆ ˆ
i i i
ci i i
zc zci i i i
u wMRS MRS
n w w
l
σ
γ
 
= − 
 
, (44a) 
 2 0
iσ = . (44b) 
 
In equation (44a), 1, 1 1 1 1[ / ] / [ / ]
i i i i i
zcMRS u z u c= ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  denotes the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and private consumption for the low-ability type, while 2,ˆ
i
zcMRS  denotes the 
corresponding marginal rate of substitution for the mimicker. Then, by using equations (39)-
(42) and (44a)-(44b), we show in the Appendix that the optimal marginal income tax rate for 
individuals of ability type j in country i can be written in a general form as: 
 
  ,' ( )
i i
j zci i i i
j j j i i i i
j
MRS LT w l
w N c
σ
γ
∂
= −
∂
. (45) 
 
In what follows, we will not focus on the interpretation of the variables 1
iσ  and 2
iσ , as these 
are well understood and explained elsewhere (e.g., Stiglitz, 1982). Instead, we will focus on 
how the marginal income tax rates are modified due to the relative consumption concerns. As 
can be observed from equation (45), the optimal marginal income tax rate of either ability 
type can be written as an additively separable expression, where in addition to ijσ  there is a 
second term that is proportional to the within-country positionality effect, /i iL c∂ ∂ . To be 
able to explore this positionality effect in greater detail, such that we can express the marginal 
income tax rates in terms of positionality degrees, we start by introducing a measure of the 
difference in the partial degree of domestic positionality between the mimicker and the low-
ability type as follows:  
 
2,
2 1
ˆ
ˆ
ii
cid i i
i i
u
N
lα α α
γ
 = −  . (46) 
 
We can then derive the following result with respect to the within-country positionality effect: 
 
Lemma 2. For country i, whose government is a Nash competitor to the governments in the 
other countries, the within-country positionality effect can be written as 
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 2 12,
ˆˆ
1 1 1
i ii i i id
i i i i i i
ci i i i
L N u N
c
α αα α αγ l γ
α α α
−∂ −
= − + = −
∂ − − −
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
The within-country positionality effect for country i can be decomposed into two separate 
parts reflecting: (1) the average degree of domestic positionality, iα , and (2) the difference in 
the degree of domestic positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type, idα . 
Clearly, the average degree of domestic positionality contributes negatively to welfare in 
country i, as it reflects the direct welfare cost of the externality that each individual imposes 
on other domestic residents. On the other hand, the indicator of positionality differences leads 
to increased domestic welfare if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type (in 
which case 0idα > ), and lower domestic welfare if the low-ability type is more positional 
than the mimicker (so 0idα < ). The intuition is that if the mimicker is more (less) positional 
than the low-ability type, an increase in ic  will contribute to relax (tighten) the self-selection 
constraint, ceteris paribus. Note also that since the government in country i behaves as a Nash 
competitor vis-à-vis all other countries, it treats the average consumption in all other countries 
(as summarized by the elements of the vector ic −  in equation (30)) as exogenous. As a 
consequence, the within-country positionality effect does not depend directly on any measure 
of foreign positionality. 
 
By combining equation (45) and Lemma 2, we can now derive: 
 
Proposition 5. In Nash equilibrium, the optimal marginal income tax rate facing individuals 
of ability type j in country i can be expressed in terms of positionality degrees such that (for 
j=1,2) 
  ' ( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
id
i i i i i i i i
j j j j j idT w l
ασ α σ α σ
α
= + − − − −
−
. 
 
Proof: Substituting the within-country positionality effect from Lemma 2 into equation (45), 
we obtain 
29 
 
 
, 2, 2 1
1 2
,
ˆ ˆ
'( )
1 1
1
i i i i ii
j zc ci i i i
j j j i i ii i i
j
i i id
j zci
j i i
j
MRS u
T w l
w n n
MRS
w
l α αασ
α αγ
α ασ
α
 −
 = + −
− − +   
−
= +
−
, (47) 
Using , / 1 '( )
i i i i i
j zc j j jMRS w T w l= −  in equation (47) and then solving for '( )
i i i
j jT w l  gives 
 1'( )
1 1
i i id
i i i i
j j jid idT w l
α α ασ
α α
− −
= +
− −
, (48) 
which can be re-arranged to give the tax formula in Proposition 5. QED 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of the marginal income tax formula in Proposition 5 is 
again given by the expression for the optimal marginal income tax rate in the conventional 
case without any positional concerns. The second term reflects the incentive facing the 
domestic government to correct for positional externalities and depends on the average degree 
of within-country positionality. If 1 0
iσ >  (as in the standard optimal income tax model where 
the consumers share a common utility function), this corrective component is smaller for the 
low-ability type than for the high-ability type. The third term reflects an incentive for the 
government to relax the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the mimicker and the low-
ability type may differ in terms of positional concerns. Consider first the case where 2 1ˆ
i iα α> , 
such that 0idα > . This means that an increase in average domestic consumption (with the 
average consumption in other countries held constant) will cause a larger utility loss, in 
monetary terms, for the mimicker than for the low-ability type. Hence, an increase in ic  
makes it less attractive to become a mimicker, such that the self-selection constraint is 
relaxed. This is clearly beneficial from a social point of view, and implies a corresponding 
reason for reducing the marginal income tax rate. The intuition for the opposite case where 
0idα <  is analogous. Note also that the result in Proposition 5 resembles the tax policy 
implications of positional concerns derived for a one-country economy by Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008). This is so because all positional externalities caused to other 
countries are ignored by the Nash-competing national governments. 
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5.4 Optimal tax policy in the Stackelberg-competition case 
 
Let us again assume, as we did in subsection 3.2, that country i is a Stackelberg leader in 
relation to country k, which is a Stackelberg follower, and that country i plays the Nash game 
with all other countries. As in subsection 3.2 above, we focus on the policy incentives facing 
the Stackelberg leader; the policy incentives facing the follower are analogous to those facing 
the governments in the Nash game analyzed in subsection 5.3. Hence, the government in 
country i will treat the average consumption in country k as a function of the average 
consumption in country i. Let us rewrite the Lagrangean in (38) to make this explicit: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2 1 1
2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
, , , ( ) [ , , , ( ) ]
ˆ, , , ( ) , , , ( )
[ ( ) ( )]
i i i i i k i i i i i i k i i
i
i i i i i k i i i i i k i
i
i i i i i i i i i
L u c z c c c u c z c c c u
wu c z c c c u c H l c c c
w
n w l c n w l c
δ
l
γ
= + −
  
+ − −  
  
+ − + −

, (49) 
 
where the average consumption in countries other than i and k have been suppressed for 
notational convenience. The first order conditions with respect to the hours of work for both 
ability types remain the same as in the Nash equilibrium case, i.e., as (39) and (41), while the 
first order conditions for 1
ic  and 2
ic  are given as 
 
1
1, 2, 1ˆ 0
ii
i i i i i
c c i i
ndLu u n
dc N
l γ− − + = , (50)
 
2
2, 2( ) 0
ii
i i i i i
c i i
ndLu n
dc N
δ l γ+ − + = , (51) 
  
where  
 
1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2,
ˆ ˆi k i k i k
i k k k
i i i i i i i i i
i i i ic c c c c c
dL c c cu u u u u u
dc c c c
δ l l
   ∂ ∂ ∂ = + + + + − +    ∂ ∂ ∂   
. (52) 
 
By analogy to equation (43), we can interpret equation (52) as measuring the within-country 
positionality effect for the Stackelberg leader. The difference is that country i is here assumed 
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to be first mover and will, therefore, also consider the indirect relationship between ic  and 
kc , which provides an additional channel through which the government may increase the 
domestic welfare. Since the social first order conditions are analogous to those in the Nash 
equilibrium case, with the only exception being that /i iL c∂ ∂  is replaced by /i idL dc  in (50) 
and (51) compared with (40) and (42), it follows that the optimal marginal income tax rates 
can be written as 
 
  ,' ( )
i i
j zci i i i
j j j i i i i
j
MRS dLT w l
w N dc
σ
γ
= − . (53) 
 
Equation (53) takes the same form as equation (45) above, with the exception that the within-
country positionality effect is now different. To be able to rewrite equation (53) in terms of 
degrees of positionality, let us first introduce the following measure of difference in the partial 
degree of foreign positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type:  
 
2,
2 1
ˆ ˆ
ii
cikd ik ik
i i
u
N
lβ β β
γ
 = −  . (54) 
 
As such, 0ikdβ >  ( 0< ) if the mimicker in country i is more (less) positional than the low-
ability type relative to the average consumption in country k. The following result will be 
used to characterize the optimal tax policy of the Stackelberg leader: 
 
Lemma 3. For country i, where the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k, 
the within-country positionality effect can be written as 
 
11
k k
i ik id ikd
i ii ik ikd
i i i i
ki ik
i ik
i
c c
c cdL N N
cdc
c
α β α β
ψ ψγ γ
ψα β
 ∂ ∂
+ − + ∂ ∂ − = − = −
∂ −− −
∂
, 
where 
k
ik i ik
i
c
c
ψ α β ∂= +
∂
 and 
k
ikd id ikd
i
c
c
ψ α β ∂= +
∂
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
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We can think of ikψ  and ikdψ  as measuring the “average degree of effective positionality” 
and the “difference in the degree of effective positionality between the mimicker and the low-
ability type,” respectively, from the point of view of the government in country i, which is 
acting as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k. In particular, note that these measures also 
reflect the partial degrees of foreign positionality (in addition to the partial degrees of 
domestic positionality), since the government in country i may explore the relationship 
between ic  and kc  for purposes of externality correction and redistribution. The marginal 
income tax rates can be characterized as follows:11 
 
Proposition 6. (i) The optimal second-best marginal income tax rate for individuals of ability 
type j in country i, where the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis country k, is given 
by (for j=1,2) 
  
 ' ( ) 1 1 1
1
ikd
i i i i i ik ik i
j j j j jikdT w l
ψσ σ ψ ψ σ
ψ
     = + − − − −     −
. 
(ii) Given the levels of ijσ , 
iα , idα , ikβ , and ikdβ , and if ik ikdβ β> , the optimal marginal 
income tax rates chosen by the Stackelberg leader are larger (smaller) than the Nash 
equilibrium rates if the consumption in country k is characterized by a cross-country keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses (staying-away-from-the-Joneses) property with respect to the 
consumption in country i such that 
 0 ( 0)
k
i
c
c
∂
> <
∂
. 
 
 
Proof: The first part follows by analogy to the proof of Proposition 5 by replacing iα and idα  
with ikψ  and ikdψ , respectively. To prove the second part, multiply and divide the second 
term on the right-hand side of the tax formula in the proposition by 1 ikdψ−  and rearrange to 
derive 
                                                          
11 Lemma 1 is not necessarily applicable here, since the two-type model with asymmetric information has a 
much more complicated structure than the representative-agent model in Section 3. 
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( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )1
'( )
1
1
k
i i id ik ikd
i ik ikd j i
ji i i i i
j j j jikd k
id ikd
i
c
c
T w l
c
c
σ α α β βσ ψ ψ
σ σ
ψ
α β
 ∂
− − + − − − ∂ = + = +
−  ∂
− + ∂ 
.  (55) 
With ik ikdβ β> , and if / 0k ic c∂ ∂ >  ( 0< ), the right-hand side of equation (55) is larger 
(smaller) than in the Nash case where all β -terms are absent. QED 
 
The marginal income tax formula implemented by the Stackelberg leader takes the same 
general form as that implemented by a follower. The difference is that the Stackelberg leader 
behaves as if ψ  is the appropriate measure of positionality, whereas the follower behaves as 
in the Nash game, where α  is the appropriate measure of positionality. Therefore, if the 
consumption of the Stackelberg follower is characterized by the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses 
property discussed above, the policy decided by country i, i.e., the Stackelberg leader, may be 
closer to a globally optimal policy than that implemented by the follower. We will return to 
this comparison below. Note also that the interpretation of Proposition 6 is close – yet not 
equivalent – to the interpretation of Proposition 5, due to that the magnitudes (and possibly 
also the signs) of ikψ  and ikdψ  depend on the reaction function ( )k ic c . If / 0k ic c∂ ∂ > , 
which appears to be a plausible assumption, the incentives to correct for positional 
externalities are stronger for a government acting as a Stackelberg leader than for a Nash 
competitor, whereas these incentives instead are weaker if / 0k ic c∂ ∂ <  (in fact, if ikβ  is 
sufficiently large, we cannot rule out the possibility that 0ikψ < , although this outcome 
appears very unlikely). Similarly, the interpretation of the variable ikdψ  is more complex than 
the interpretation of idα , as ikdψ  reflects differences in the degree of positionality between the 
mimicker and the low-ability type in two dimensions. The practical importance of 
Propositions 5 and 6 is, nevertheless, clear: the two propositions show exactly what 
information the national policy maker (who acts as a Nash competitor and Stackelberg leader, 
respectively) needs in order to implement the desired resource allocation through tax policy in 
a decentralized setting. 
 
5.5 The scope for a Pareto-improving tax reform 
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We showed in subsection 4.1 that each government in the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg 
equilibrium, respectively, is willing to pay a positive amount to other countries for them to 
increase their income taxes. Hence, there exists a Pareto-improving tax reform. The situation 
in the more general second-best case is similar. That there are two types of individuals in each 
country does not matter per se, since it would be beneficial for other countries if the marginal 
income tax rates were increased for both types. Yet, what is crucial is that welfare in one 
country is affected negatively by increased consumption in other countries, i.e., the mimicker 
must not be so much more positional than the low-ability type that the welfare loss due to the 
direct positional externality is fully offset by a welfare benefit of increased reference 
consumption through the self-selection constraint. To be more specific, we have the following 
result: 
 
Proposition 7. Based on either the Nash equilibrium or the Stackelberg game equilibrium, 
there is scope for Pareto-improving tax reforms through small increases in the marginal 
income tax rates, provided that the direct positional externality dominates the self-selection 
effect in the sense that / 0i kL c∂ ∂ <  for 1,2i =  and k i≠ . 
 
In Proposition 7, iL  is given by equation (38) in the Nash-equilibrium case and equation (49) 
in the Stackelberg-equilibrium case. As such, for a coordinated tax increase to be welfare 
improving, the positionality effect referred to in the proposition means that the average degree 
of foreign positionality must dominate the effect of the difference in this degree of 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. This is analogous to the results 
derived above. 
 
5.6 Efficient international negotiations on the tax rates 
 
Consider, as in subsection 4.2, the case where the countries can negotiate with each other 
about the tax policy without transaction costs. For convenience, suppose also that we only 
have two countries, i and k. Country i would then be willing to buy a further tax increase in 
country k as long as the welfare cost for country i of paying country k is smaller than the 
welfare gain of the reduced consumption in country k due to the tax increase. This means that 
country k will take into account the welfare effects caused to country i, and vice versa.   
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Consider the Lagrangean corresponding to the maximization of the utility facing the low-
ability type in country i, while holding constant the utility of the high-ability type in country i 
and the utility facing both ability types in country k subject to a self-selection constraint in 
each country and an overall resource constraint:  
 
 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
i i i i i i k k k k k k
i i i i i i i i k k k k k k k k
L u u u u u u u u u u u
n w l c n w l c n w l c n w l c
δ l w µ u
γ
= + − + − + − + − + −
+ − + − + − + −
, (56) 
 
where kju  for j=1,2 denote the minimum utility levels for residents in country k. The first 
order conditions with respect to leisure and consumption for the individuals in country i take 
the same general form as equations (39)-(42), implying that equation (45) holds here as well. 
Yet, the relevant positionality effect is now different and given by 
 
 
1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1,
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i i i i i
i
i i i k k k
i c c c c c c
L u u u u u u
c
δ l l w u w µ∂ = + + − + + − +
∂
, (57) 
 
since country i will, in this case, recognize the welfare effects it causes on country k. The 
corresponding social first order conditions with respect to leisure and consumption for 
country k are given by 
 
1, 2, 1 1ˆ 0
k k k k k
z zu u n wµ w φ γ− + + = , (58)  
1
1, 2, 1ˆ 0
ki
k k i
c c k k
nLu u n
c N
µ w γ ∂− − + =
∂
, (59) 
2, 2 2( ) 0
k k k
zu n wu w γ− + + = , (60)  
2
2, 2( ) 0
ki
k k
c k k
nLu n
c N
u w γ ∂+ − + =
∂
, (61) 
 
where 1 2
k k kN n n= +  and 
 
 
1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1,
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )k k k k k k
i
i i i i i k k k
k c c c c c c
L u u u u u u
c
δ l l w u w µ∂ = + + − + + − +
∂
. (62) 
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Therefore, since the positionality effect for each country is now different compared with those 
associated with the non-cooperative regimes analyzed above, the optimal marginal income tax 
rates as expressed in terms of relative consumption comparisons will of course also be 
different. 
 
Without loss of generality, we simplify the analysis by focusing on a symmetric equilibrium 
where the two countries are identical in the sense of the following assumption: 12 
 
A1. i kα α α= = , ik kiβ β β= = , id kd dα α α= = , id kd dβ β β= = , and i kN N= . 
 
Note that these assumptions do not mean that the two countries are identical also in other 
respects; they may still differ in terms of wage and population distributions and preferences 
for leisure and private consumption. We can then derive the following result: 
 
Lemma 4. For a country i that can negotiate without transaction costs with another country 
k, and under assumption A1, the positionality effect is given by 
 
1
i d
i
L N
c
ρ ργ
ρ
∂ −
= −
∂ −
, 
where ρ α β= +  and d d dρ α β= + . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Note that the positionality effect in Lemma 4 reflects the welfare effects of an increase in ic  
facing both countries, i.e., when country i can negotiate over tax policy with country k, it will 
also recognize the welfare cost of its policy for country k. This is also the reason why the 
positionality effect is governed by the average degree of total positionality, ρ , and the 
difference in the degree of total positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type, 
dρ , instead of the corresponding measures (α  and dα ) as in the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium (see Lemma 2). With this (quite substantial) modification, the intuition behind the 
                                                          
12 This allows us to avoid unnecessarily complex expressions due to differences in population sizes or degrees of 
positionality across countries. It does not affect the basic intuition behind the results.  
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formula in Lemma 4 is the same as that behind the corresponding expression in Lemma 2. We 
can now characterize the optimal marginal income tax rates. 
 
Proposition 8. For a country i that can negotiate without transaction costs with another 
country k, and under assumption A1, the optimal marginal income tax rate implemented for 
ability type j in country i can be written as 
 ' ( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
d
i i i i i i
j j j j j dT w l
ρσ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ
= + − − − −
−
. 
 
Proof: By using the first order conditions, we can derive 
 ,' ( ) ,
i i
j zci i i i
j j j i i i i
j
MRS LT w l
w N c
σ
γ
∂
= −
∂
 (63) 
which takes the same general form as equation (45). By using Lemma 4, the proof of 
Proposition 8 then follows by analogy to the proofs of Propositions 5 and 6. QED 
 
Proposition 8 generalizes the Pareto-efficient optimal tax structure derived by Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008) for a one-country economy to a multi-country economy with 
international positional externalities. As such, an increase in the average degree of total 
positionality (which is here given by the average degree of domestic positionality in country i 
plus the average degree of foreign positionality in country k) contributes to increase the 
marginal income tax rates implemented for the residents of country i. Furthermore, if the 
mimicker is more (less) positional than the low-ability type, here measured in terms of the 
total degree of positionality, there is an incentive to relax the self-selection constraint through 
a lower (higher) marginal income tax rate for each ability type. 
 
Note also that in the symmetric case analyzed here we can obtain a straightforward 
relationship between the socially efficient marginal income tax rates and the rates 
implemented in the non-cooperative regimes (addressed in Propositions 5 and 6). Let 
'( )i i in j jT w l , ' ( )
i i i
s j jT w l , and '( )
i i i
c j jT w l  denote the marginal income tax rate implemented for 
ability type j when the government in country i acts as a Nash competitor, Stackelberg leader, 
and in accordance with the cooperative game set out here, respectively. The following result 
is an immediate consequence of Propositions 5, 6, and 8: 
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Corollary 2. Under assumption A1, and given the levels of ijσ , α , β , 
dα , and dβ , we have 
 ' ( ) ' ( ) '( )i i i i i i i i in j j s j j c j jT w l T w l T w l< <  for j=1,2, 
if (i) dβ β>  and (ii) / (0,1)k ic c∂ ∂ ∈ . 
 
Clearly, dβ β>  means that the marginal income tax rate implemented in the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium falls short of the socially efficient rate, i.e., ' ( ) '( )i i i i i in j j c j jT w l T w l< ; the 
second condition then means that the marginal income tax rate decided by the Stackelberg 
leader falls between these two extremes. 
 
Overall, we conclude that the scope for international tax policy coordination due to cross-
country social comparisons remains large also in a second-best world without the possibility 
of using non-distortionary taxation. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Cross-country social comparisons have most likely become more important over time. This is 
both intuitively plausible and consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that increased 
globalization in recent decades has influenced the social comparisons inherent in individual 
well-being, such that consumption comparisons with people in other countries have increased 
in importance. In the present paper, we take this evidence seriously and analyze optimal 
income taxation under relative consumption concerns in a multi-country framework, where 
each individual in each country compares his/her own consumption both with that of other 
domestic residents and with that of people in other countries. Furthermore, our framework 
allows for differences in relative consumption concerns, depending on whether they refer to 
within-country or between-country comparisons, as well as for differences in preferences for 
relative consumption between individuals and across countries.  
 
There are for sure many existing papers dealing with strategic interaction and the potential for 
policy coordination between governments due to environmental externalities as well as 
international labor and capital mobility. Yet, in the present paper we explicitly abstract from 
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each of these reasons and show that international social comparisons by themselves constitute 
important reasons for strategic interaction, and that there may be large social values of 
international tax policy coordination. In doing this we distinguish between the tax policy 
implicit in non-cooperative regimes where the national governments act as Nash competitors 
to one another or engage in Stackelberg competition, and the tax policy implicit in a 
cooperative regime where the countries can negotiate over tax policy. Our choice to focus on 
international social comparisons does not reflect a belief that other motives for international 
tax coordination are unimportant. Rather, the results here should be interpreted as further 
strengthening the case for such coordination, as recently suggested by Piketty (2014) and 
others. 
 
We start by examining a simple framework where each country is modeled as a 
representative-agent economy, which means that we abstract from distributional concerns 
within each country. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to one another, 
the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country 
comparisons, meaning that the optimal marginal income tax rate in each country reflects the 
degree of domestic positionality, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a 
Stackelberg game reflects between-country comparisons as well. Furthermore, if the residents 
of the Stackelberg follower country are characterized by cross-country keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences, then the marginal income tax implemented by the leader country in the 
Stackelberg game typically exceeds that implemented by the follower, as well as exceeds the 
marginal income tax rates implicit in the Nash equilibrium. We also derive the globally 
efficient tax structure in the cooperative regime and show that cooperation leads to higher 
marginal income tax rates than implicit in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, and under 
certain conditions also higher marginal income tax rates than implemented by the leader 
country in the Stackelberg game. We also show how the optimal marginal income tax rates in 
the cooperative regime reflect domestic as well as foreign degrees of positionality. 
 
In the second part of the paper, we extend the analysis by allowing the consumers within each 
country to differ in ability (productivity) and assume that such ability is private information. 
This is well motivated because earlier research based on second-best analysis of one-country 
model economies shows that the policy implications of positional concerns may differ 
substantially from those that follow from representative-agent models. Once again, we 
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compare the three regimes mentioned above. In general, these comparisons give ambiguous 
results, as externality correction may either tighten or relax the self-selection constraint. 
However, under a relatively mild additional assumption, namely that the difference in the 
degree of foreign positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type is not too large, 
the qualitative results for the representative-agent framework referred to above will continue 
to hold also in the second-best setting. 
 
We believe that the insights from the present paper, and in particular the scope for 
international tax coordination, will grow more important over time. This is because we 
anticipate that the globalization process will continue and that cross-country social 
comparisons will correspondingly increase further in importance.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 
The social first order condition in country k can be written as 
 
0kk k k kc zcu u w u + − =   
 
By total differentiation, while recognizing that k kc c= , we have 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k k k k k
k i k i i
k k k k k k k k k k
cc zcc c c c c c zc
k k k k k k k k k i
cz zzc z cc c c zc
u u w u dc u u w u dc
u u w u dz u u w u dc
   + − + + −   
   + + − = − + −   
. (A1) 
 
Use the resource constraint in country k, 
 
 ( ) 0k k kw z cΩ− − = , 
 
to derive 
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  1
k
k k
dz
dc w
= − . (A2) 
 
Substituting equation (A2) into equation (A1) and solving for /k idc dc  gives 
 
 
( )
/
i k i i
k k k kk
cc c c zc
i k
u u w udc
dc w
+ −
=
Φ
, (A3) 
 
where 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 2 0k k k k kk k k k k k k k k kcc cz zzc c c c c c c zu u w u u w u u w uΦ ≡ − + − + + + − >  
from the second order conditions. Therefore, the right-hand side of equation (A3) is positive if 
( ) 0i k i ik k k kcc c c zcu u w u+ − >  and vice versa. 
 
Now, differentiate ( ) /kk k k kcz c zcSMRS u u u= +  with respect to 
ic , 
 
 
( )i k i i
k
k k k kk
cc c c zccz
i k k
c c
u u w uSMRS
c u u
+ −∂
=
∂ +
, 
 
where we have used /( )kk k k kz c cw u u u= + . We can then rewrite equation (A3) such that 
 
 
kkk
czz
i i
SMRSudc
dc c
∂
=
Φ ∂
. (A4) 
 
Therefore, / 0 ( 0)k idc dc > <  if / 0 ( 0)k iczSMRS c∂ ∂ > < . 
 
Derivation of equation (45) 
 
Combine equations (39) and (40), which gives 
 
42 
 
 1 11, 2, 2, 1 1 1,
1 2 2
ˆ ˆ
i ii
i i i i i i i i i
zc c z zci i i i
n wLMRS u u n w MRS
c n n w
l l γ
 ∂  − = + −   ∂ + 
. (A5) 
 
From equation (32) we have 1 1, 1 1' ( )
i i i i i
zcw MRS T w l− = . Substituting into equation (A5) and 
solving for 1 1' ( )
i i iT w l  gives equation (45) for the low-ability type. The result for the high-
ability type is obtained equivalently by instead combining equations (32), (41), and (42).  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
 
We start by re-expressing the terms of equation (43). From the utility function (30) follows 
that  
,
, , , ,, ,
,
i
i i
i
j ci i i i i i i
j R j R j c j j cij c j c
j c
r
u v r v r u
r
α= = = − , (A6) 
where we have used (33) and ,, 1i
i i
j cj c
r r = − . Substituting equation (A6) into equation (43) 
gives 
1 1, 2 2, 2 2,ˆ ˆ( )
i
i i i i i i i i i
c c ci
L u u u
c
α δ l α l α∂ = − − + +
∂
. (A7) 
Now, equations (40) and (42) can be rewritten as 
1
1, 2, 1
1 2
ˆ
ii
i i i i i
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nLu u n
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l γ ∂= + −
∂ +
 
2
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1 2
( )
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i i i i i
c i i i
nLu n
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δ l γ ∂+ = −
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, 
which if substituted into equation (A7) imply (after collecting terms and using equation (36a)) 
2 1
1 2 2,
ˆˆ
1 1
i ii i
i i i i i
ci i i
L n n u
c
α ααγ l
α α
−∂  = − + + ∂ − −
. (A8) 
QED 
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Proof of Lemma 3 
 
By using equation (30), we can derive  
 
,
, , , ,, ,
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k
k k
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j ci i i i i ik i
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u v s v s u
s
β= = = − , (A9) 
 
where we have used (36b) and ,, 1k
i i
j cj c
s s = − . Substituting equation (A9) into equation (54) 
gives 
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Rewriting equations (52) and (53) such that 
 11, 2, 1
1 2
ˆ
ii
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c c i i i
ndLu u n
dc n n
l γ= + −
+
 
 22, 2
1 2
( )
ii
i i i i i
c i i i
ndLu n
dc n n
δ l γ+ = −
+
 
and then substituting into equation (A10) gives (after collecting terms) 
 
2 2 1 1
1 2 2,
ˆˆ
ˆ
1 1
k k k
i ik i ik i ik
i i i i
i i i i i
ck ki
i ik i ik
i i
c c c
dL c c cn n u
c cdc
c c
α β α β α β
γ l
α β α β
∂ ∂ ∂
+ + − −
∂ ∂ ∂ = − + +  ∂ ∂
− − − −
∂ ∂
, (A11) 
which can be rearranged to give the result in Lemma 3. QED 
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Substituting the first three terms in equation (57) as was done in the derivation of equation 
(A9), we get 
 
1 2
1 2, 1 2 2 2 2,
1 2
1 2, 1 2 2 2 2,
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆˆ
i ii i i
i i i i i i i
c ci i i i i
k ki i
k i k k k k k
c ck k k k
n nL L Lu n n u
c c N c N
n nL Lu n n u
c N c N
α l γ α γ lα
β w γ β γ wβ
   ∂ ∂ ∂
= − + − − − +   ∂ ∂ ∂   
   ∂ ∂
− + − − − +   ∂ ∂   
.               (A12) 
Using the positionality measures defined in equations (36a)-(36c) and rearranging gives 
 
2, 2 1 2, 2 1
ˆˆˆ(1 ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i i i i k k k k k
c ci
i
k
k
L N u N u
c
L
c
α γ α l α α γ β w β β
β
∂
− = − + − − + −
∂
∂
+
∂
.               (A13) 
 
We can derive the analogous equation for country k: 
 
 
2, 2 1 2, 2 1
ˆ ˆˆ(1 ) ( ) ( )
i
k i i i i i k k k k k
c ck
i
i
i
L N u N u
c
L
c
α γ β l β β γ α w α α
β
∂
− = − + − − + −
∂
∂
+
∂
.              (A14) 
 
We then define idα  and idβ  according to equation (46) and (54), respectively, and apply 
analogous definitions for country k, i.e., to measure kdα  and kdβ . By substituting equation 
(A14) into equation (A13) and then using i kα α α= = , ik kiβ β β= = , id kd dα α α= = , 
id kd dβ β β= = , and i kN N= , we obtain the positionality effect in Lemma 4. QED 
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